In Hiroshima's Shadow
By Noam Chomsky
August 6, the anniversary of Hiroshima, should be a day of
somber reflection, not only on the terrible events of that day in 1945, but
also on what they revealed: that humans, in their dedicated quest to extend
their capacities for destruction, had finally found a way to approach the
ultimate limit.
This year‚ Aug. 6 memorials have special significance. They
take place shortly before the 50th anniversary of, "the most dangerous
moment in human history," in the words of the historian and John F.
Kennedy adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., referring to the Cuban missile
crisis.
Graham Allison writes in the current issue of Foreign
Affairs that Kennedy, "ordered actions that he knew would increase the
risk not only of conventional war but also nuclear war," with a likelihood
of perhaps 50 percent, he believed, an estimate that Allison regards as
realistic.
Kennedy declared a high-level nuclear alert that authorized,
"NATO aircraft with Turkish pilots ... (or others) ... to take off, fly to
Moscow, and drop a bomb."
None were more shocked by the discovery of missiles in Cuba
than the men in charge of the similar missiles that the U.S. had secretly
deployed in Okinawa six months earlier, surely aimed at China, at a moment of elevated
regional tensions.
Kennedy took Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, "right to the
brink of nuclear war and he looked over the edge and had no stomach for
it," according to Gen. David Burchinal, then a high-ranking official in
the Pentagon planning staff. One can hardly count on such sanity forever.
Khrushchev accepted a formula that Kennedy devised, ending
the crisis just short of war. The formula‚ boldest element, Allison writes,
was, "a secret sweetener that promised the withdrawal of U.S. missiles
from Turkey within six months after the crisis was resolved." These were
obsolete missiles that were being replaced by far more lethal, and
invulnerable, Polaris submarines.
In brief, even at high risk of war of unimaginable
destruction, it was felt necessary to reinforce the principle that U.S. has the
unilateral right to deploy nuclear missiles anywhere, some aimed at China or at
the borders of Russia, which had previously placed no missiles outside the
USSR. Justifications of course have been offered, but I do not think they
withstand analysis.
An accompanying principle is that Cuba had no right to have
missiles for defense against what appeared to be an imminent U.S. invasion. The
plans for Kennedy‚ terrorist programs, Operation Mongoose, called for,
"open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime," in October 1962,
the month of the missile crisis, recognizing that, "final success will
require decisive U.S. military intervention."
The terrorist operations against Cuba are commonly dismissed
by U.S. commentators as insignificant CIA shenanigans. The victims, not
surprisingly, see matters rather differently. We can at last hear their voices
in Keith Bolender‚, "Voices from the Other Side: An Oral History of
Terrorism Against Cuba."
The events of October 1962 are widely hailed as Kennedy's‚
finest hour. Allison offers them as, "a guide for how to defuse conflicts,
manage great-power relationships, and make sound decisions about foreign policy
in general." In particular, today‚ conflicts with Iran and China.
Disaster was perilously close in 1962, and there has been no
shortage of dangerous moments since. In 1973, in the last days of the
Arab-Israeli war, Henry Kissinger called a high-level nuclear alert. India and
Pakistan have come close to nuclear war. There have been innumerable cases when
human intervention aborted nuclear attack only moments before launch after
false reports by automated systems. There is much to think about on Aug. 6.
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